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Abstract
We investigate whether money constitutes a perfect substitute for the miss-
ing record-keeping technology in a quasi-linear environment, where private in-
formation and limited commitment are present. We adopt the mechanism de-
sign approach and solve a social planners problem subject to the resource
constraint, the incentive constraints imposed by the existing frictions, and the
available memory technologies. The result is that when money is divisible, con-
cealable and in variable supply, a single money may or may not be su¢ cient to
replace the record-keeping technology. We further show that two monies serve
as a perfect substitute for the record-keeping technology so that there is no
need for a third money.
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1 Introduction
Micro-founded monetary theory explains how an intrinsically useless object can be
valued in exchange. Recent advances in the literature seem to have reached a consen-
sus that the role of money is to make up for the missing memory or the record-keeping
technology, i.e., see Kocherlakota (1998a; b): A natural question to follow is whether
money constitutes a perfect substitute for the record-keeping technology. Most micro-
founded monetary models feature one single money and there is no welfare-enhancing
role for a second money. In this paper, we show that when money is divisible, conceal-
able and in variable supply, a single money may or may not be su¢ cient to replace
the record-keeping technology. We then show that in the latter case, introducing a
second money improves welfare, and that two monies act as a perfect substitute for
the record-keeping technology.
We construct a heterogeneous agent model in a quasilinear environment as intro-
duced by Lagos and Wright (2005). There are two types of agents and two locations
indexed by a and b: In every period, a location/preference shock randomly assigns
agents to one of the two locations and determines their marginal utilities from con-
sumption. Type a (b) agents have high marginal utilities at location a (b) and low
marginal utilities at location b (a). Since agents at the same location are endowed
with the same amount of goods, the rst-best allocation requires that agents with
low marginal utilities transfer some of their endowment to agents with high marginal
utilities.
There are two frictions in the economy: limited commitment and private informa-
tion about types. In the presence of the these frictions, an implementable allocation
must be incentive compatible to ensure participation and truthful revelation of types.
Throughout the paper, we adopt a mechanism design approach and solve the condi-
tions under which the rst-best allocation satises the relevant incentive constraints.
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We rst analyze mechanisms with a perfect record-keeping technology. The mech-
anism can directly record nonparticipation and impose perpetual autarky as the pun-
ishment.1 With regard to private information, the mechanism asks agents to report
their types, records the information and uses it later on to infer agentsmarginal util-
ities. Due to the symmetry structure of the preferences, agents have the incentive to
truthfully report their types ex ante (we call this early-sortingbecause the incentive
is aligned before the realization of the location shock) at the rst-best allocation. The
rst-best allocation can be achieved as long as the participation constraint is satised,
or agents are patient enough.
Next, we assume that the record-keeping technology is not available, but the
society has access to one at money. By rewarding participants with more money
and requiring an ever increasing amount of money for future participation, one-money
mechanisms can deal with limited commitment as e¤ectively as mechanisms with the
record-keeping technology. However, one-money mechanisms are not as powerful
in dealing with private information. With a single concealable money, encoding and
passing information on ex ante type reporting becomes problematic. Di¤erent reports
can only be encoded into di¤erent money balances, which however, can be hidden to
prevent credible information communication. In this case, the only e¤ective way
to deal with private information is to induce agents to reveal their types/marginal
utilities after the period location shock (we call this late-sorting).
Due to quasilinearity, the late-sorting mechanism involves no ex ante welfare cost;
it, however, imposes an extra constraint on the patience parameter. As a result, the
restriction on the patience parameter to implement the rst-best allocation is more
stringent than with the record-keeping technology. There exists a positive measure
of the patience parameter such that the rst-best allocation can be achieved with
the record-keeping technology, but not with one money. Hence, one money is not a
1We assume that the most severe societal penalty is ostracism.
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perfect substitute for the record-keeping technology in the quasilinear environment
that we consider.
We then investigate mechanisms when a second money is introduced. We nd
that having two monies allows the mechanism to use monetary portfolios and total
money balances to record ex ante reporting about types. Moreover, the information
can be credibly passed into the future. It follows that two monies act as a perfect
substitute for the record-keeping technology. We also extend the above results to
an environment with more than two types of agents. We argue in general that two
monies are a perfect substitute for the record-keeping technology so that there is no
need for a third money.
Our work is most closely related to Kocherlakota and Krueger (1999), and Kocher-
lakota (2002) which also study the essentiality of multiple monies.2
Kocherlakota and Krueger (1999) share with us a common feature that a second
money improves welfare in that a second money serves as a signalling device to deal
with private information. Their model, however, builds on Trejos and Wright (1995)
with indivisible money. The result that there is no need for a third money cannot be
extended to multiple-type-agent models. Moreover, the quasilinear preferences in our
model introduce an additional way (the late-sorting mechanism) to align incentives.
It follows that a second money is inessential if agents are patient enough (because
late-sorting is powerful enough to deal with both private information and limited
commitment).
Kocherlakota (2002) correctly points out that when money is concealable, it is
necessary to establish a monotonic relationship between properbehavior and money
2There is another strand of literature investigating whether multiple currencies can coexist or
circulate at the same time. Examples are Trejos and Wright (2001), Camera and Winkler (2003),
Camera, Craig and Waller (2004), and Craig and Waller (2004). Our papers goal is to study the
welfare enhancing role of multiple currencies, or whether multiple currencies are essential.
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balances. In Kocherlakota (2002); limited commitment makes it impossible to estab-
lish such a relationship and renders the need for a second money. This conclusion,
however, hinges critically on the assumption of a xed money supply. When money
supply is xed, the only way to record whether an agent behaves properly is to transfer
some money to him from somebody else (who might also behave properly). Agents
money holdings will di¤er in general. The rst-best allocation, however, requires
that future allocation should not discriminate those with less money balances. The
mechanism that we propose circumvents the problem by increasing money supply to
reward all properly behaved participants. Limited commitment thus does not justify
a role for a second money if money supply is allowed to change.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the physical en-
vironment and characterizes the rst-best allocation. Section 3 introduces private
information and limited commitment. We solve for the condition to achieve the rst-
best allocation when the society has access to a record-keeping technology. Section
4 studies the optimal monetary mechanisms when the record-keeping technology is
absent, and establishes the condition under which a second money is essential. Sec-
tion 5 extends the results to a multi-type-agent model. Section 6 argues in general
that two monies constitute a perfect substitute for the record-keeping technology. We
conclude and suggest directions for future research in section 7.
2 The Physical Environment
The framework that we adopt is the quasi-linear environment suggested by Lagos and
Wright (2005) without the search friction. Time is discrete and runs from 0 to 1:
Each period consists of two stages: day and night. There are two locations a and b:
Inter-location interaction is allowed during the day but prohibited at night. There are
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three non-storable goods, one day good and two location-specic night goods indexed
by 1 and 2: Good 1 is local to location a and good 2 is local to location b: There are
two types of agents each is of measure 1:
During the day, all agents can produce or consume the day good. They have the
same linear preference over the good. Let z be the amount of production (consumption
if z is negative). The disutility of production (utility of consumption if z is negative)
is  z:
At night, agents consume one of the two night goods. The two types of agents
are distinguished by their preferences over the two night goods. Type a value good
1 more than good 2; and type b value good 2 more than good 1. It might be helpful
to think of type a as local consumers of good 1 and foreign consumers of good 2;
similarly, think of type b as local consumers of good 2 and foreign consumers of good
1: The utility of a local consumer is u(c) and the utility of a foreigner is u(c); where
 > 1, u(0) = 0; u00 < 0 < u0 and u0(0) = +1: Which night good an agent consumes
is determined by a preference shock realized upon entering the night stage. With
probability 1=2; an agent becomes a local consumer and has a high valuation of the
night good. With probability 1=2; the agent becomes a foreign consumer and has a
low valuation of the night good. We assume that each agent is endowed with y units
of the location-specic good after the realization of the preference shock. Note that at
the night stage, each location is inhabited by two types of agents who value the night
good di¤erently. Refer to Figure 1 for a graphical illustration of the environment.
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Type a
?u(c1), ?>1
Type b
u(c1)
1/2
Night
Type a: -z
(Measure 1)
Type b: -z
(Measure 1)
Day
Location a
Figure 1: Environment
1/2
1/2
1/2
Type a
u(c2)
Type b
?u(c2), ?>1
Location b
The life-time expected utility of a type a agent i 2 (0; 1) is:
E0
1X
t=0
t

 zat (i) +
1
2

u(ca1;t(i)) + u(c
a
2;t(i))

:
where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor, zat (i) is the production (consumption if
negative) of the day good; and ca1;t(i) and c
a
2;t(i) are the consumption of (night) good
1 and 2 respectively.
Similarly, the life-time expected utility of a type b agent j 2 (0; 1) is:
E0
1X
t=0
t

 zbt (j) +
1
2

u(cb2;t(j)) + u(c
b
1;t(j))

:
The resource constraints are given by:
Z 1
0
zat (i)di+
Z 1
0
zbt (j)dj = 0
at the day stage, and
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Z 1
0
ca1;t(i)I
a
t (i)di+
Z 1
0
cb1;t(j)I
a
t (j)dj = 2y at location a;Z 1
0
ca2;t(i)I
b
t (i)di+
Z 1
0
cb2;t(j)I
b
t (j)dj = 2y at location b;
at the night stage for all t  0: Ikt () is an indicator function and is equal to 1 if the
agent is at location k 2 fa; bg at date t:
We will focus on symmetric stationary allocations where for all i and j 2 (0; 1)
and k 2 fa; bg;
 ca1;t(i) = cb2;t(j) = ch, ca2;t(j) = cb1;t(i) = c` with ch + c` = 2y for t  0;
 za0(i) = zb0(j) = 0;
 zkt () =
8>><>>:
zh; if the agent consumed ch at the night stage of time t  1;
z`; if the agent consumed c` at the night stage of time t  1;
with zh + z` = 0 for t  1.
The social planners problem is to choose (ch; c`; zh; z`) to maximize the ex ante
utility:
W (ch; c`; y) =
1
2
1
1   [u(ch) + u(c`)] ; (1)
subject to
ch + c` = 2y:
The solution is characterized by:
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u0(ch) = u
0(c`);
ch + c

` = 2y;
W  =
1
2
1
1   [u(c

h) + u(c

`)] :
Note that since  > 1; ch > y > c

` : The planner can instruct the night stage low-
valuation agents to lend    y   c` units of his endowment to high-valuation
agents. For the day stage allocation, note that since zt enters linearly in preferences,
any zat (i) and z
b
t (j) that satisfy E0z
a
t (i) = E0z
b
t (j) = 0 would satisfy the day stage
resource constraint and entail no ex ante welfare loss. In the current context, one
such allocation is zat (i) = z
b
t (j) = 0 for all i and j and t  0:
The rst-best allocation can be achieved if agentstypes are public information,
and agents are able to commit to sticking with the allocation.
3 Limited Commitment and Private Information
Assume that agents cannot commit, and agentstypes and thus their valuations of
the night goods are private information. In this case, a record-keeping technology
becomes essential to overcome the frictions caused by limited commitment and private
information (see Kocherlakota, 1998a; b).
In the presence of limited commitment and private information, an implementable
allocation must satisfy individual rationality or participation constraints (so that indi-
viduals have the incentive to stick with the mechanism), and the incentive constraints
(so that individuals have the incentive to truthfully reveal their private information).3
3We assume that group deviation and side trades can be prevented to avoid extra constraints
incurred by the market structure.
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When agents cannot commit, the allocation (ch; c`; z) must respect ex post ratio-
nality. Assuming that the punishment for nonparticipation is autarky, the welfare
is
W0 =
1
2
1
1   [u(y) + u(y)]: (2)
It is straightforward that W  > W0. At the night stage, there are two individual
rationality conditions: one for high-valuation agents and one for low-valuation agents,
u(ch) + ( zh +W )  u(y) + W0; (3)
u(c`) + ( z` +W )  u(y) + W0; (4)
whereW is as dened in (1). At the day stage, there are also two individual rationality
conditions:
 zh +W  W0; (5)
 z` +W  W0: (6)
Note that if ch > c`; for night stage high-valuation agents, the day stage individual
rationality condition (5) implies the night stage individual rationality condition (3).
For night stage low-valuation agents, the night stage individual rationality condition
(4) implies the day stage individual rationality condition (6). An implementable
allocation with ch > c` must satisfy (5) and (4), which we rewrite and label as (IRH)
and (IRL) respectively. To simplify notation, let z = zh =  z`:
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z  W  W0; (IRH)
z  W0  W + u(y)  u(c`)

; (IRL)
If a mechanism prescribes higher night consumption for high-valuation agents
(which is the case at the rst-best allocation), low-valuation agents will have the in-
centive to claim to be high-valuation agents. Private information about types implies
that agents can potentially lie about their valuations of the night goods.
Due to the structure of the preference shocks, there are two ways to deal with the
incentive problem caused by private information. Since the two types of agents always
value the same night good di¤erently, the planner can induce agents to truthfully
reveal their types at the day stage and use the information to infer an agents valuation
of the night good. For example, if an agent reports to be a type a agent and shows
up at location b; the planner can infer that the agent is a low-valuation agent. Note
that since recorded information can be passed into the innite future, the mechanism
only needs to ask agents to report their types once at the day stage of periods 0: The
information will then be used in all the following periods.4 We call this mechanism
the early-sorting mechanism because information used to identify agentsvaluations
is revealed before the realization of the preference shocks. To use the early-sorting
mechanism, the following constraint needs to be satised:
1
1  

u(ch)  zh
2
+
u(c`)  z`
2

 1
1  

u(c`)  z`
2
+
u(ch)  zh
2

;
(ICT)
which holds if ch > c`:5
4This explains why we use life-time utilities in the ICT .
5If ch > c`; using ICT does not impose extra constraints on the day stage allocation z other than
the resource constraint.
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Alternatively, the planner can skip type reporting and try to induce the agents
to truthfully report their valuations of the night goods by resorting to variations in
production/consumption at the following day stage. We call this the late-sorting
mechanism, which is e¤ective if and only if the following two conditions are satised:6
u(ch) + ( zh +W )  u(c`) + ( z` +W );
u(c`) + ( z` +W )  u(ch) + ( zh +W ):
We can rearrange the two incentive constraints as (again, let z = zh =  z` to simplify
notation):
z  [u(ch)  u(c`)]
2
; (ICH)
z  u(ch)  u(c`)
2
: (ICL)
The rst constraint ensures that high-valuation agents do not want to imitate low-
valuation agents (note that this means that type a agents do not want to imitate type
b agents at location a; and that type b agents do not want to imitate type a agents
at location b): The second constraint ensures that low-valuation agents do not want
to imitate high-valuation agents.7
Proposition 1 states the condition under which the rst-best allocation can be
achieved when the planner has access to a record-keeping technology,
Proposition 1 When agents lack commitment and hold private information about
their types, a record-keeping technology can achieve the rst-best allocation if and
6We call this late sortingbecause information used to identify agents valuations is revealed
after the realization of the preference shocks.
7Strictly speaking, there is a third way to align agents incentives by allowing each agent to
consume his endowment, which is obviously not optimal.
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only if   0 where 0 is dened as:
0 =
u(y)  u(c`)
[u(ch)  u(y)]
:
Proof. With a record-keeping technology, the planner can use ICT to deal with
private information. Since ch > c

` ; the rst-best allocation meets ICT automatically.
The rst-best can be achieved if and only if there exists a z such that IRH and IRL
are satised, or
W0  W  + u(y)  u(c`)

 W   W0;
which, with some manipulation, can be rewritten as:
  1

u(y)  u(c`)
u(ch)  u(y)
 0:
Proposition 1 states that the rst-best allocation is implementable when agents
are patient enough. Andolfatto (2008) has a similar result. The key friction that
generates this result is limited commitment. Private information can be overcome
since the rst-best allocation entails ch > c

` . As long as a record-keeping technology
is available, ICT is automatically satised. There is no need to use ICH and ICL.
4 Monetary Mechanisms
Now suppose that the society has no access to the record-keeping technology. Then
it is impossible to directly pass information across time. In this case, the planner
uses tokens which we call money as a substitute for the missing record-keeping
technology to communicate information across stages.8 We assume that money is
8The society, though, has access to a contemporaneous memory technology which can remember
agentsactions within a stage.
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perfectly divisible, concealable and in variable supply.
4.1 One-Money Mechanisms
We rst assume that there is a single money available and study if one money is
a perfect substitute for the record-keeping technology. One-money mechanisms can
deal with limited commitment as follows. By rewarding participants with money and
increasing the amount of money required for future participation, a one-money mech-
anism can e¤ectively catch nonparticipants and cast them into perpetual autarky.
The individual rationality constraints remain the same as in the case with a record-
keeping technology. Note that the concealability of money balances does not pose a
problem here since the proposed mechanism establishes a monotonically increasing
relationship between participation and money balances so that people do not have
the incentive to hide money.
Now we show how one-money mechanisms deal with private information. The
question we ask is whether the planner can encode type reports into money holdings
and use them later on to identify agentsvaluations of the night goods. The answer
is no. It means that early-sorting cannot be used in one-money mechanisms.
With one money, the only way to encode type reports is to associate di¤erent
types with di¤erent money balances. For example, the planner can give those who
report to be type a more money. To use early-sorting, the planner is supposed to
give high consumption to those with more money (or those reported to be type a)
at location a; and those with less money (or those reported to be type b) at location
b. The problem is that at location b; those with more money have the incentive and
ability to mimic those with less money to demand for higher consumption: A quick
examination of gure 2 shows that holding more money is strictly preferred to holding
less money, so all agents will report to be type a agents at the day stage of period 0.
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All agents will hold the same amount of money. The planner will not be able to infer
agentsvaluations of the night goods based on their money holdings.
hcM ,
lcm,
Night
)(Ma
)(mb
Day
Location a
lcM ,
hcm,
Location b
Figure 2: Early sorting ineffective with a single concealable money
(M>m)
To induce agents to truthfully reveal their valuations of the night goods, the
planner must rely on the late-sorting mechanism. The planner can give all agents the
same amount of money at the day stage of period 0: High-valuation agents can choose
to consume more at the night stage, but they need to work more in the future. They
will leave the night stage with less money and work more in the following day stage
to accumulate more money. In this case, we need to replace ICT by ICH and ICL.
Proposition 2 states the condition under which one-money mechanisms can achieve
the rst-best allocation.
Proposition 2 When agents lack commitment and hold private information about
their types, one-money mechanisms can achieve the rst-best allocation if and only if
  1; with 1 given by:
1 =
u(ch)  u(c`)
( + 1)[u(ch)  u(y)]
> 0:
Proof. Consider the following mechanism.
Let 0 < h < ` < 1:
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At date 0 day stage, the mechanism endows each agent with one unit of money
($).
At date 0 night stage, after preference shocks are realized, the mechanism o¤ers
agents the following choices:
Show 1 $;
8>><>>:
use   good (1 or 2) to exchange for ` $; or
receive   good (1 or 2) and h $:
With this mechanism, non-participants leave with 1 $ and participants leave with
more than 1 $: Participants receiving transfers consume more and leave with lower
money balances; those giving up endowment consume less and leave with higher
balances.9
At date 1 day stage, the mechanism o¤ers agents the following options:
Show (1 + h) $; use z day good to exchange for (1  h) $;
Show (1 + `) $; receive z day good and (1  `) $;
With this mechanism, all participants leave the stage with 2 units of money and
non-participating agents leave with less than 2 units of money. Participants entering
with lower balances work to earn extra money.
At date 1 night stage, the choices are:
Show 2 $;
8>><>>:
use   good (1 or 2) to exchange for ` $; or
receive   good (1 or 2) and h $:
At date t  2 day stage, the choices are:
Show (t+ h) $; use z day good to exchange for (1  h) $;
Show (t+ `) $; receive z day good and (1  `) $;
At date t  2 night stage, the choices are:
9Since there is a contemporaneous memory technology, the mechanism can prevent agents from
participating more than once.
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Show (t+ 1) $;
8>><>>:
use   good (1 or 2) to exchange for h $; or
receive   good (1 or 2) and ` $;
Note that under this mechanism, if an agent skips a stage, his money balance will
fall short of the required balances to participate in all of the following stages. The
mechanism e¤ectively catches non-participants and casts them into perpetual autarky.
The individual rationality conditions thus remain the same as in the case with the
record-keeping technology.
The rst-best allocation can be achieved if and only if there exists a z such that at
(ch; c

` ; z); ICH, ICL, IRH and IRL are satised, or
u(ch)  u (c`)
2
 z  [u(c

h)  u (c`)]
2
; (IC)
u(y)  u(c`)

+W0  W   z  W   W0: (IR)
z is non-empty if and only if
u(ch)  u(c`)
2
 W   W0;
which can be rearranged as:
  u(c

h)  u(c`)
( + 1)[u(ch)  u(y)]
 1:
If follows from u(ch) + u(c

`) > (1 + )u(y) that 1 > 0: 
The one-money mechanism outlined above deals with frictions caused by lim-
ited commitment and private information as follows. By rewarding participants with
newly issued money and increasing the money balances required for future partici-
pation, the mechanism e¤ectively catches non-participants and casts them into per-
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petual autarky. By requiring previous high-valuation agents to work for previous
low-valuation agents at the day stage, the mechanism induces agents to truthfully re-
veal private information and signal preferences by choosing di¤erent money balances
at the night stage. The rst-best allocation can be implemented if and only if   1.
When 0 <  < 1, the one-money mechanism cannot implement the rst-best al-
location, while the mechanism with a record-keeping technology can. In this sense,
the one-money mechanism is less powerful in dealing with private information about
types.
4.2 Two-Money Mechanisms
Given that one-money mechanisms cannot fully replicate the allocations that are
implementable with a record-keeping technology, we introduce a second money in
this subsection and show that two monies constitute a perfect substitute for the
record-keeping technology.
Label the two monies as "red" and "green". Similar to the one-money mecha-
nism, the two-money mechanism can reward participants with more money balances
and e¤ectively exclude nonparticipants from the mechanism forever. The individ-
ual rationality conditions thus stay the same as in the case with the record-keeping
technology.
What is di¤erent from the one-money mechanism is that two-money mechanisms
make ICT feasible again. The planner can encode type reports into monetary port-
folios with the same total balances but di¤erent compositions of the two monies, and
request agents to show the same total balances at the night stage. For example,
suppose that the planner gives those reporting as type a more red money and those
reporting as type b more green money. At the following night stage, the planner
requires more red money for high consumption at location a and more green money
18
for high consumption at location b: By requesting all agents to show the same total
money balances, agents will not be able to juggle their portfolios to renege on their
earlier reports. The early-sorting mechanism is thus reinstated (see Figure 3): As in
the case with record-keeping technology, the rst-best allocation can be achieved if
and only if   0:
haa cgr ),,(
lcgr bb ),,(
Night
),( aa gra
),( bb grb
Day
Location a
lcgr aa ),,(
hbb cgr ),,(
Location b
Figure 3: Early sorting effective with two monies
(ra+ga=rb+gb, ra>rb)
Proposition 3 When agents lack commitment and hold private information about
their types, two monies act as a prefect substitute for the record-keeping technology
and can achieve the rst-best allocation if and only if   0.
Proof. Call the two monies red (R) and green (G): Consider the following mechanism.
At date 0 day stage, the mechanism asks agents to choose from two monetary
portfolios: 1 R or 1 G:
At date 0 night stage, after the shocks are realized, the mechanism o¤ers agents
the following choices:
At location a,
Show R; receive   good 1 and  R; where 0 <  < 1;
Show G; use   good 1 to exchange for  R;
At location b,
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Show G; receive   good 2 and  G;
Show R; use   good 2 to exchange for  G;
With this mechanism, non-participants leave the night stage with 1 unit of money
and participants leave with more than 1 unit of money: Participants with higher
consumption leave the night stage with a single type of money (i.e., 1 +  units of R
at location a); participants with lower consumption leave with two types of money
(for example, 1 unit of G and  units of R at location a). All participants exit the
night stage with the same total money balances 1 + .
At date 1 day stage,
Show (1 + ) R; use z day output to exchange for (1  ) R;
Show (1 + ) G; use z day output to exchange for (1  ) G;
Show R +  G; use  G to exchange for z day output and 1 R;
Show G+  R; use  R to exchange for z day output and 1 G;
At date 1 night stage,
At location a,
Show 2 R; receive   good 1 and  R;
Show 2 G; use   good 1 to exchange for  R;
At location b,
Show 2 G; receive   good 2 and  G;
Show 2 R; use   good 2 to exchange for  G;
At date t  2 day stage,
Show (t+ ) R; use z day output to exchange for (1  ) R;
Show (t+ ) G; use z day output to exchange for (1  ) G;
Show t R +  G; use  G to exchange for z day output and 1 R;
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Show t G+  R; use  R to exchange for z day output and 1 G;
At date t  2 night stage,
At location a:
Show (t+ 1) R; receive   good 1 and  R;
Show (t+ 1) G; use   good 1 to exchange for  R;
At location b:
Show (t+ 1) G; receive   good 2 and  G;
Show (t+ 1) R; use   good 2 to exchange for  G:
The two-money mechanism described here rewards participants with more money
balances, e¤ectively catches non-participants and bars them from participating in the
mechanism forever. The individual rationality conditions thus stay the same as in
the case with the record-keeping technology.
The two-money mechanism can induce the two types of agents to hold di¤erent mone-
tary portfolios with the same total balances. At the night stages, low-valuation agents
will not be able to falsely claim to be high-valuation agents. For example, suppose
that type a choose to hold red money and type b choose to hold green money at
date 0: At the following night stage, a type a agent at location b is a low-valuation
agent and cannot claim to be a high-valuation agent since he does not have the green
money required for higher consumption. We verify in the following that the two
types of agents indeed have the incentive to di¤erentiate themselves from each other
by choosing di¤erent monetary portfolios at date 0. Take type a agents as an example.
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The expected life-time utility from holding the red money is:10
W ar =
1
2
1
1   [u(c

h) + u(c

`)];
and the expected utility from holding the green money is:
W ag =
1
2
1
1   [u(c

`) + u(c

h)]:
It is straightforward that W ar > W
a
g so that type a agents prefer holding the red
money.
The mechanism outlined above can achieve the rst-best allocation if the allocation
(ch; c`; z) satises ICT , IRH and IRL at (ch; c

`): As in the case with a record-keeping
technology, the rst-best allocation can be achieved if and only if   0:
The two-money mechanism induces the two types of agents to hold di¤erent mon-
etary portfolios. Since the two portfolios feature the same total balances, it is im-
possible to juggle ones portfolio to renege on earlier type reports. The early-sorting
mechanism (ICT ) is thus reinstated and two monies provide a perfect substitute for
the record-keeping technology. The introduction of a second money improves welfare
when  < 1:
11
10Note that under the proposed mechanism, agents hold the same color of money while entering
all night stages; they basically make only one type reporting choice when they decide what portfolio
to hold at the day stage of period 0: This is why we compare the life-time utilities from holding
di¤erent monetary portfolios.
11Note that when  < 0; the rst-best allocation cannot be achieved even with a record-keeping
technology. It can be shown that two monies are still a perfect substitute for the record-keeping
technology and two-money mechanisms strictly improve welfare over one-money mechanisms.
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5 Extension to Multi-type-agent Models
In this section, we show that as in Townsend (1987), two monies consist of a perfect
substitute for the record-keeping technology even when there are more than two types
of agents.12 The optimal two-money mechanism is to let di¤erent types hold di¤erent
combinations of the red and green monies, with all combinations giving the same
total money balances.
There are N < +1 symmetric locations and N location specic night goods.
There are N types of agents distinguished by their preferences over the night goods.
A type m 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng agent derives utility mnu(cmn) from consuming cmn units
of night good n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng; where mn = m n+I(m<n)N , 0 > 1 > 2 > ::: >
N 1 > 0; and I(m < n) = 1 if m > n and 0 otherwise. For example, type 1 agents
derive utility 0(c) from goods at location 1, N 1u(c) from goods at location 2,..., and
1u(c) from goods at location N ; type N agents derive utility 0u(c) from goods at
location N; N 1u(c) from goods at location 1, ..., and 1u(c) from goods at location
N   1. See table 1 for an illustration of the structure of the preferences.
Table 1: Preference shocks
Good
Agent type 1 2 .  .  . n .  .  . N-1 N
1 ?0 ?N-1 .  .  . ?1-n+N .  .  . ?2 ?1
2 ?1 ?0 .  .  . ?2-n+N .  .  . ?3 ?2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
m ?m-1 ?m-2 .  .  . ?m-n+I(m<n)N .  .  . ?m+1 ?m
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
N-1 ?N-2 ?N-3 .  .  . ?N-1-n .  .  . ?0 ?N-1
N ?N-1 ?N-2 .  .  . ?N-n .  .  . ?1 ?0
12Kocherlakota and Krueger (1999) also mention that two monies are su¢ cient in their model
which has only two types of agents. With indivisible monies, however, more monies will be needed
if there are more than two types of agents.
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During the day, all agents can produce and consume the day good. At night, each
agent is subject to a preference shock and goes to each of the N locations with the
same probability 1=N: After agents are relocated, at location n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng; all
agents are endowed with y units of good n, but they di¤er in their valuations of the
good. Agents cannot commit and agentstypes and thus their valuations of the night
goods are private information.
We focus on symmetric stationary allocations where all agents with the same
valuations of night goods consume the same amount, or for any m;n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng;
 cmnt = cmn = cm n+I(m<n)N for t  0 where cmnt is the consumption of type m
agents at location n in period t night stage;
 zm0 = 0;
 zmnt = zm n+I(m<n)N if the agent consumed cmn at the night stage of time t 1
for t  1;
The rst-best night stage consumption is characterized by
qu
0(cq) = q0u
0(cq0) for all q 6= q0 2 f0; 1; :::; N   1g;
N 1X
q=0
cq = Ny:
Any day stage allocation (z0; z1; ::; zN 1) satisfying
PN 1
q=0 zq = 0 satises the resource
constraint and is consistent with the rst-best allocation. The rst-best life-time
welfare of a representative agent is:
WN =
1
N
1
1  
"
N 1X
q=0
qu(c

q)
#
:
We rst characterize the condition under which the rst-best can be achieved
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when the planner has access to a record-keeping technology. Suppose that c0 > c

1 >
::: > cB 1 > y > c

B > ::: > c

N 1 so that at the rst-best allocation, B types of agents
are borrowers who consume more than their endowment, and N  B types of agents
are lenders who consume less than their endowment.
To deal with limited commitment, the following 2N individual rationality condi-
tions must be satised: for all q; q0 2 f0; 1; :::; N   1g and q 6= q0;
qu(cq) + ( zq +WN)  qu(y) + WN0 ;
 zq +WN  WN0 ;
where
WN =
1
N
1
1  
"
N 1X
q=0
qu(cq)
#
and
WN0 =
1
N
1
1  u(y)
N 1X
q=0
q:
There are two ways to deal with the friction caused by private information. If
early-sorting is used, the following (N2  N) constraints must be satised:
1
N
1
1  
"
NX
n=1
mnu(cmn)
#
 1
N
1
1  
"
NX
n=1
mnu(cm0n)
#
;
for allm;m0 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng andm0 6= m: If late-sorting is used, the following (N2 N)
constraints must be satised:
qu(cq) + ( zq +WN)  qu(cq0) + ( zq0 +WN);
for all q 6= q0 2 f0; 1; :::; N   1g:
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Following the steps in section 3, it can be shown that the ICT s hold at the rst-
best allocation. When there is a record-keeping technology, the rst-best allocation
can be achieved if and only if
  N0 =
PN 1
q=B q

u(y)  u(cq)
PB 1
q=0 q

u(cq)  u(y)
 :
In the absence of a record-keeping technology, one-money mechanisms must resort
to late-sorting to align incentives, and the rst-best allocation can be achieved if and
only if
  N1 =
PN 1
q=1 (N   q)q

u(cq 1)  u(cq)
PN 1
q=1 (N   q)q

u(cq 1)  u(cq)

+
PN 1
q=0 q

u(cq)  u(y)
  N0 :
The following proposed mechanism with two monies (R and G) shows that two
monies act as a perfect substitute for the missing record-keeping technology. Two-
money mechanisms improve welfare over one-money mechanisms when  < N1 :
At the day stage of date 0, the mechanism asks agents to choose from N
monetary portfolios:
rm R + (1  rm) G;
with 0 < rm < 1 for all m 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng and rm 6= rm0 for all m 6= m0:
At the night stage of date 0, after the shocks are realized, the planner o¤ers
each agent the following choices:
At location n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng,
Show rm R + (1  rm) G; get cmn = cm n+I(m<n)N good n and "[rn R + (1  rn)
G] where 0 < " < min
m6=m02f1;2;:::;Ng
fjrm   rm0jg;
The mechanism requires agents to show 1 unit of money to participate in the stage,
and proposes consumption contingent on the composition of monetary portfolios held
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by agents. The mechanism rewards participating agents with " units of money, the
composition of which di¤ers across locations. We restrict " to ensure that agents of
di¤erent types and consuming at di¤erent locations exit the night stage with di¤erent
monetary portfolios.
At the day stage of the t  1 period,
Show t[rm R + (1   rm) G] + "[rn R + (1   rn) G]; use zmn = zm n+I(m<n)N day
output and "[rn R + (1  rn) G] to exchange for [rm R + (1  rm) G];
At the night stage of the t  1 period,
At location n,
Show (t+1)[rm R+(1 rm)G]; get cmn = cm n+I(m<n)N good n and "[rn R+(1 rn)
G]:
The two-money mechanism outlined here deals with limited commitment and
private information exactly the same way as the two-money mechanism with two
types of agents. As long as N is nite, we can see that two monies are always a
perfect substitute for the record-keeping technology. If money is indivisible as in
Kocherlakota and Krueger (1999), we will need at least N monies to replace the
record-keeping technology when there are N types of agents.
6 TwoMonies as A Perfect Substitute for the Record-
Keeping Technology
In our models environment, two monies are su¢ cient to replace the record-keeping
technology. Townsend (1987) and Kocherlakota (2002) have similar results in di¤erent
environments. Here we develop an intuitive argument to show that two monies are
always su¢ cient as a substitute for the record-keeping technology so there is no need
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for a third money.
If money balances are not concealable, there is a one-to-one match between records
and money balances, money balances will thus carry the relevant information into
future periods. When money balances are concealable, however, the one-to-one match
will be destroyed since individuals can change balances by hiding money. Or, the
concealability of money balances makes it possible for individuals to change records
to their own benets. The introduction of a second money solves the problem by
encoding records into di¤erent monetary portfolios with the same total balances and
di¤erent compositions of the two monies. Agents will not be able to juggle their
monetary portfolios to mimic other portfolios by concealing money. Note that when
money is divisible, it is possible to encode any nite number of records into di¤erent
monetary portfolios so a third money will not be needed.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we show in a quasi-linear environment that in the presence of private
information and limited commitment, a second money can potentially improve welfare
by providing an e¢ cient way to pass information across time.
In the absence of a record-keeping technology, monetary mechanisms (with either
a single money or two monies) can e¤ectively deal with limited commitment by re-
warding participants with more money balances and requiring ever increasing money
for future participation. The individual rationality conditions stay the same as in
the case with the record-keeping technology where defectors are directly caught and
forced into perpetual autarky.
There are two options to deal with private information about preferences. The
rst is to induce agents to truthfully report their types before the realization of the
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preference shocks and use the information later on to infer agentsvaluations of the
night goods. We call this early-sorting. The second option is to induce agents to
report their valuations after the realization of the preference shocks, and use the day
stage consumption/production to align the incentives. We call this late-sorting.
Mechanisms with a single concealable money rule out early-sorting. When agents
are patient enough, the late-sorting mechanism e¤ectively aligns the incentive by
inducing agents to leave the night stage with di¤erent money balances and pro-
duce/consume di¤erent amounts in the following day stage. When agents are not
patient enough, the late-sorting mechanism is not powerful enough to align incen-
tives. The introduction of a second money permits the early-sorting mechanism and
allows agents to signal their preferences by holding di¤erent monetary portfolios (with
the same total money balances).
We intend to extend the paper in the following way. In the paper, we take the
mechanism design approach and there is no market in the mechanisms proposed in
the paper. We would like to follow Waller (2007) to see if the allocations can be
decentralized with market mechanisms (and with the help of monetary and scal
policies).
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